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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the twenty-first century national security law has become among the 
most challenging of legal disciplines in which to practice.  This 
development has several causes, not least that the field embraces the most 
fundamental of all governmental functions: the Nation’s security.  As the 
Supreme Court insisted in Haig v. Agee,
1
 “It is ‘obvious and unarguable’ 
that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the 
Nation.”2 
Before one examines the ethical conundrums occasioned by a national 
security law practice, the linkage of that discipline with developments in 
international law deserves comment.  The tragedy of the 9/11 attacks and 
the resulting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention the ongoing 
worldwide offensive against terrorists, have underlined not just the axiom of 
security being the most “compelling” of governmental interests, but also the 
reality that U.S. national security is inextricably intertwined with 
international events.  In fact, one of the most important reasons for the rise 
of national security law has been the growing importance of law generally 
in international affairs. 
That growth is, in large measure, a reflection of the phenomenon of 
globalization.
3
  This has significantly impacted the law because the dramatic 
  
 * Major General, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), J.D., Villanova University School of Law, 1975; B.A., 
St. Joseph’s University, 1972.  Deputy Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force, 2006–2010.  Professor 
of the Practice of Law and Executive Director, Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, Duke 
University School of Law.  This Article is based on a lecture presented as part of Ohio Northern Univer-
sity’s Pettit College of 2012 Carhart Lecture Series on Legal Ethics, and some matters were previously 
discussed by the author in The Ethical Dimension of National Security Law, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 789 
(2009). 
           1.   453 U.S. 280 (1981). 
 2. Id. at 307 (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)).  
 3. The International Monetary Fund defines globalization as follows: 
 
Economic “globalization” is a historical process, the result of human innovation and 
technological progress. It refers to the increasing integration of economies around the world, 
particularly through the movement of goods, services, and capital across borders. The term 
sometimes also refers to the movement of people (labor) and knowledge (technology) across 
international borders. There are also broader cultural, political, and environmental 
dimensions of globalization. 
 
1058 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
increase in world commerce demands internationally accepted legal norms, 
instruments, and adjudicatory forums in order to work effectively.  The 
Economist notes that we now live in “a world where barriers to the transfer 
of goods, expertise and people are coming down” and further observes that 
in “history, whenever cross-border commerce has flourished . . . so too have 
trade lawyers with broad horizons . . . .”4 
The globalization of law, aroused by the globalization of commerce, has 
helped revolutionize the practice of international law,
5
 with real 
implications for a national security law practice.  It is no surprise that 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor uses martial language when she says that 
“understanding international law is no longer just a legal specialty; it is 
becoming a duty.”6  According to U.S. News & World Report: “Since the 
early 1990s, an explosion of international trade, the end of the Cold War, 
the rise of the Internet, and proliferation of international tribunals, and the 
new global war on terrorism have transformed the field of [international] 
law.”7 
The juxtaposition of the “new global war on terrorism” with “an 
explosion of international trade” is significant for the national security law 
practitioner because history repeatedly demonstrates that major 
developments in the economic sphere inevitably shape the conduct of war.  
Thus, everything from the development of agriculture (which permitted the 
rise of mass armies), to the industrial revolution (which enabled the 
mechanization of war), to the information age (whose technology permits 
  
 
The term “globalization” began to be used more commonly in the 1980s, reflecting 
technological advances that made it easier and quicker to complete international 
transactions—both trade and financial flows. It refers to an extension beyond national borders 
of the same market forces that have operated for centuries at all levels of human economic 
activity—village markets, urban industries, or financial centers. 
 
There are countless indicators that illustrate how goods, capital, and people, have become 
more globalized. 
 
IMF Staff, Globalization: A Brief Overview, INT’L MONETARY FUND (May 2008), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2008/053008.htm.  
 4. Not entirely free, your honour, ECONOMIST, July 10, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/ 
16693882.  
 5. See, e.g., Sabino Cassese, The Globalization of Law, 37 INT’L L. & POLITICS 973, 981–86 
(2005), http://iilj.org/GAL/documents/THEGLOBALIZATIONOFLAW.pdf.  
 6. Sarah Kellogg, Toward an International Legal System, DC BAR, http://www.dcbar.org/ 
for_lawyers/resources/publications/washington_lawyer/september_2006/international.cfm (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2012) (quoting Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States). 
 7. Dan Gilgoff, Law Schools Go International, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 12, 2004), 
available at http://www.utopiapolitics.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=22570&mode= 
threaded&pid=304791.  
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precision weaponry) illustrates how developments in the commercial sphere 
profoundly influence the way humans have fought. 
It should not be surprising that the prominence the law—and lawyers—
has achieved in the realm of globalized commerce parallels a similar growth 
in influence in national security matters, including the conduct of war.  
Senior military leaders acknowledge the new environment.  General James 
Jones, the former commander of NATO forces, conceded that twenty-first 
century warfare is now “very legalistic and very complex,” requiring “a 
lawyer or a dozen.”8  In part, this “legalistic” aspect of warfare results from 
efforts of today’s adversaries to manipulate respect for the rule of law into 
something they can exploit.  Professor William Eckhardt explains: 
Knowing that our society so respects the rule of law that it demands 
compliance with it, our enemies carefully attack our military plans 
as illegal and immoral and our execution of those plans as contrary 
to the law of war.  Our vulnerability here is what philosopher of war 
Carl von Clausewitz would term our “center of gravity.”9 
The evolving role of law—and lawyers—in national security matters 
post-9/11 has not been without controversy about the professional ethics of 
the discipline’s practitioners.  Cynics, for example, argue that war is 
becoming “overlawyered.”10  More specifically, former Office of Legal 
Counsel (“OLC”) attorneys John Yoo and Jay Bybee were accused by the 
Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”) of 
professional misconduct by “failing to provide ‘thorough, candid, and 
objective’ analysis in memoranda regarding the interrogation of detained 
terror suspects.”11 
A review by David Margolis, the Associate Deputy Attorney General, 
rejected the OPR findings and concluded that no professional misconduct, 
per se, had taken place.
12
  He did so even though he found that there were 
“some significant flaws” in the memos,13 and that “Yoo and Bybee 
  
 8. Lyric Wallwork Winik, A Marine’s Toughest Mission, PARADE, Jan. 19, 2003, available at 
http://www.network54.com/Forum/135069/message/1043158278/A+Marine%27s+Toughest+Mission. 
 9. William George Eckhardt, Lawyering for Uncle Sam When He Draws His Sword, 4 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 431, 434 (2003). 
 10. See, e.g., Michael Barone, The Overlawyered War, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sep. 16, 
2007), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/mbarone/articles/2007/09/16/the-criminalizing-of-warfare-has-
brought-the-overlawyered-war. 
 11. Memorandum from David Margolis, Associate Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to the Attorney Gen., the Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 68 (Jan. 5, 2010) [hereinafter 
Memorandum from David Margolis], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAGMargolis 
Memo100105.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 12. See id. at 64–65. 
 13. Id. at 67. 
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exercised poor judgment by overstating the certainty of their conclusions 
and understating countervailing arguments.”14 
As critics have pointed out, Margolis’ conclusions are based on a 
standard employed by OPR that essentially requires proving more than what 
the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Rules might require.  David 
Luban maintains:  
The OPR standard requires not just an ethics violation, but an ethics 
violation that the lawyer committed intentionally or in reckless 
disregard of the rules of conduct. In other words, OPR’s framework 
requires proof of a guilty mental state over and above what the 
ethics rules themselves require.
15
 
Consequently, the cases of Yoo and Bybee, notwithstanding the exoneration 
of the two on ethics charges, do not provide much precedent useful to 
attorneys charged with ethics violations in the future, especially if they are 
judged on the more demanding standards of competence and candor 
expressed in the ABA Model Rules.
16
 
Beyond allegations of professional malfeasance, at least one national 
security law practitioner actually found himself criminally charged.  Captain 
Randy Stone, U.S. Marine Corps (“USMC”), was one of the first persons 
criminally charged following the 2005 killing in Haditha, Iraq, of twenty-
four unarmed civilians by U.S. Marines.
17
  Captain Stone was alleged to 
have failed to properly report and investigate the deadly incident.
18
  
Although the court-martial convening authority (then Lieutenant General 
James Mattis, USMC) later dismissed the charges, he did so not because he 
concluded no professional errors occurred, but rather because he did not 
believe that “any mistakes Captain Stone made with respect to the incident 
[rose] to the level of criminal behavior.”19  Interestingly, Lieutenant General 
  
 14. Id. at 68. 
 15. David Luban, David Margolis Is Wrong, SLATE (Feb. 22, 2010, 11:49 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/02/david_margolis_is_wrong.html.  
 16. Compare Memorandum from David Margolis, supra note 11, with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT    (2012)    [hereinafter MODEL RULES],    available   at   http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_profess 
ional_conduct_table_of_contents.html. 
 17. John McChesney, Haditha Proceedings Begin with Marine Lawyer, NPR (May 7, 2007), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10069336. 
 18. See id.  
 19. Press Release, U.S. Marine Corps, Camp Pendleton Media Center, Charges Dismissed 
Against Marine in Haditha, Iraq Investigation, #07-016 (Aug, 9, 2007) [hereinafter Press Release], 
available at http://www.marines.mil/unit/marforcent/Haditha%20Documents/2007/Haditha%20Rel%20 
016%20070809.htm.  
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Mattis also observed that the lawyer and his fellow Marines “served in the 
most ethically challenging combat environment in the world.”20 
While the battlefields of Iraq unquestionably present an “ethically 
challenging” environment, they are not the only places where the practice of 
national security law presents ethical difficulties.  This Article does not 
purport to catalogue—let alone definitively resolve—every issue of 
professional responsibility a national security practitioner might face. It 
does, however, aim to illustrate at least some of the problems that are 
uniquely complicated by a variety of imperatives intrinsic to the national 
security law discipline. 
Generally, the ethical behavior of lawyers, to include national security 
law practitioners, is governed by their particular licensing jurisdiction’s 
code of professional responsibility.  In most instances, these local codes 
draw upon the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which represent 
the legal profession’s archetypal standards.21  The Model Rules do not, 
however, make many special accommodations for a national security 
practice,
22
 and that has caused some to question their utility
 
in resolving the 
ethical issues that arise in a national security law practice.
23
  Nevertheless, 
they provide an appropriate starting point for discussion of this very 
important topic.  Accordingly, this Article will survey the Model Rules and 
select a few of them to try to illuminate (through the examination of actual 
cases where possible) how they might apply in the national security law 
realm.  This effort starts with an examination of the Preamble of the Model 
Rules. 
II.  THE MODEL RULES 
a. Furthering the Public’s Understanding, Confidence, and 
Participation in the Rule of Law 
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, 
access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the 
  
 20. Id. 
 21. See MODEL RULES, supra note 16.  
 22. Many government lawyers are required to abide by the McDade Amendment, Ethical Stand-
ards for Federal Prosecutors Act and the Citizen’s Protection Act (also known as the “McDade Amend-
ment”) as implemented by the Ethical Standards for Attorneys for the Government, 28 C.F.R. § 77.1 
(2012).  These standards generally make a government attorney “subject to State laws and rules, and 
local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that attor-
ney’s duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State.”  28 U.S.C. § 
530B (2011). 
 23. See, e.g., Keith A. Petty, Professional Responsibility Compliance and National Security 
Attorneys: Adopting the Normative Framework of Ethical Legal Process, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1563, 1564, 
1566 (2011), http://epubs.utah.edu/index.php/ulr/article/view/680/521. 
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quality of service rendered by the legal profession . . . In addition, a 
lawyer should further the public’s understanding of and confidence 
in the rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in 
a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and 
support to maintain their authority.
24
 
This excerpt from the Preamble to the Model Rules expresses what one 
might have thought, prior to 9/11, was a rather uncontroversial 
responsibility of a legal professionalto promote the rule of law whenever 
and wherever one could.  However, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project,
25
 the Supreme Court essentially endorsed the government’s ability 
to prohibit the advancing of “the public’s understanding of and confidence 
in the rule of law and the justice system[,]” at least insofar as specific 
groups are concerned.
26
 
Humanitarian Law Project involved a statute that criminalizes “material 
support” (to include “training,” “services,” and “expert advice or 
assistance”) to certain designated terrorist organizations.27  The Secretary of 
State had designated the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (“PKK”) and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”) as terrorist organizations.28 
What the nongovernmental organizations who were parties to the case 
sought to provide appears to be exactly what the Model Rules seem to 
encourage, that is, “train[ing] members of [the] PKK on how to use 
humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes”; 
“teach[ing] PKK members how to petition various representative bodies 
such as the United Nations for relief”; “train[ing] members of [the] LTTE to 
present claims for tsunami-related aid to mediators and international 
bodies”; and “offer[ing] their legal expertise in negotiating peace 
agreements between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government.”29 
The Court concluded that such activities could be prohibited consistent 
with the First Amendment.
30
  In rationalizing its view, it conjured up a 
variety of questionable theories.  For example, it claimed that training to use 
law to peacefully resolve disputes might enable a “broader strategy to 
promote terrorism.”31  The Court hypothesized that the “PKK could, for 
example, pursue peaceful negotiation as a means of buying time to recover 
  
 24. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Preamble and Scope, ¶ 6. 
 25. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
 26. Compare id., with MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Preamble and Scope. 
 27. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2011). 
 28. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2713. 
 29. Id. at 2716. 
 30. Id. at 2731. 
 31. Id. at 2711. 
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from short-term setbacks, lulling opponents into complacency, and 
ultimately preparing for renewed attacks.”32 
Many scholars find the decision perplexing and wrong.  For example, 
one First Amendment expert, David Goldberger, calls Humanitarian Law 
Project “an incredibly broad ban on assistance to groups listed as terrorist 
groups, even where the assistance might have the effect of facilitating the 
abandonment of terrorism.”33  Even more inexplicable is the Court’s 
reasoning in justification of the ban introducing extremist organizations to 
the rule of law.  According to the Court, a “foreign terrorist organization 
introduced to the structures of the international legal system might use the 
information to threaten, manipulate, and disrupt.  This possibility is real, not 
remote.”34 
It is surprising that the Court would have so little confidence in the 
ability of various legal institutions to appropriately handle those that seek to 
“threaten, manipulate, and disrupt.”  Robust legal systems, such as that of 
the U.S., can deal with exactly that kind of person, and most develop rules 
and procedures to do so effectively.  What is the alternative?  History shows 
that extremist organizations can be pacified by integration into political and 
legal systems—the evolution of the Irish Republican Army being one 
example.
35
  Absent the incorporation of warring groups into the political 
process in accordance with the rule of law, it is difficult to conceive how 
some conflicts can be resolved.  Training about the legal system and advice 
as to how to access it, along with efforts to further the understanding of and 
confidence in the rule of law and the justice system, as suggested by the 
Model Rules Preamble, would seem to be indispensable to such efforts; yet 
Humanitarian Law Project largely precludes that, at least for certain groups. 
Although Humanitarian Law Project might be read as an unfortunate 
disparagement of the efficacy of the law to be an engine for dispute 
resolution, it is important for national security practitioners to keep in mind 
that the Court was not advocating a position, but rather merely ruling on the 
constitutionality of a statute.  Still, the national security law practitioner 
should continue to try to advance—where permitted by the law—the use of 
legal means and institutions to resolve conflicts.  However bitter and caustic 
  
 32. Id. at 2729.  
 33. Jonathan Peters, Ten questions on free speech with David Goldberger, the First Amendment 
lawyer who won Skokie, McIntyre and other SCOTUS cases, HARV. L. & POLICY REV. (July 20, 2012), 
http://hlpronline.com/2012/07/ten-questions-on-free-speech-with-david-goldberger-the-first-amendment-
lawyer-who-won-skokie-mcintyre-and-other-scotus-cases/.  
 34. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2729. 
 35. See generally Kathryn Gregory, Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations/provisional-irish-republican-
army-ira-aka-pira-provos-glaigh-na-hireann-uk-separatists/p9240.  
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legal battles may be, they are always preferable to the ones marked by 
actual bullets and blood. 
b. The Role of the Courts 
The legal profession is largely self-governing . . . [U]ltimate 
authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.
36
 
The idea that the “legal profession is largely self-governing” and that 
the “ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the 
courts”37 can be troubling in the national security setting, as the courts very 
often take a hands-off approach to national security issues.  For example, 
with respect to the military dimension of national security affairs, the 
Supreme Court declared in Gilligan v. Morgan
38
 that: 
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in 
which the courts have less competence.  The complex subtle, and 
professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, 
and control of a military force are essentially professional military 
judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and 
Executive Branches.
39
 
Courts very often seize upon an array of theories to avoid involvement 
in cases that raise national security matters.
40
  In many instances they halt 
the legal process by relying upon the “political question” doctrine,41 the 
“state secrets” theory,42 or standing.43  On other occasions, deference to the 
executive branch effectively ends litigation before the merits have been 
  
 36. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Preamble and Scope, ¶ 10.  The full paragraph reads: 
 
The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been 
granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of 
the close relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law 
enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal 
profession is vested largely in the courts. 
 
Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. 413 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 39. Id. at 10. 
 40. See STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 123 (5th ed. 2011). 
 41. See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 851 (2010). 
 42. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953); see generally TODD GARVEY & EDWARD C. LIU, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41741, THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE: PREVENTING DISCLOSURE OF 
SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION DURING CIVIL LITIGATION 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R41741.pdf.  
 43. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2010). 
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examined.
44
  Indeed, Professor Stephen Vladeck contends that as of May 
2012, there have not been any successful lawsuits “arising out of post–
September 11 U.S. counterterrorism policies alleging violations of 
plaintiffs’ individual rights.” 45  Professor Vladeck argues that a “national 
security canon” has arisen that effectively leaves those harmed by 
governmental action related to national security without legal recourse.
46
 
The judiciary’s use of these doctrines can have the effect of shielding 
the activities of lawyers from the scrutiny the courts might otherwise give 
their behavior.  As a Harvard professor and former government attorney, 
Professor Jack Goldsmith, has noted, “[o]ften when an Executive Branch 
lawyer advises a client on a national security matter, their advice takes place 
in secret without a dissenting opinion or appellate review.  This is a 
situation fraught with the possibilities of mistakes.”47  Thus, while the 
courts may well have “ultimate authority” over the professional conduct of 
attorneys, absent the transparency into their activities that litigation provides 
in other contexts, they simply cannot exercise that authority in a meaningful 
way. 
A good example of the mischief that can result is found in the case of 
U.S. v. Reynolds,
48
 which has become accepted as the seminal case for the 
state secrets doctrine.
49
  This case arose out of a 1948 Waycross, Georgia, 
crash of a B-29 bomber carrying out tests on then advancedand 
classifiedelectronic equipment.50  During discovery in a suit for damages 
by the relatives of the civilian victims (Radio Corporation of America 
employees who were aboard the ill-fated plane), the plaintiffs sought a copy 
of the Air Force’s accident investigation.51  The Government, employing 
rather ambiguous affidavits, denied the request, implying that classified 
information would be compromised by the report’s disclosure, and formally 
asserted that the report was privileged.
52
  Even the trial judge was denied 
access to it.
53
 
  
 44. Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1361–62 (2009) 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/content/pdfs/95/1361.pdf. 
 45. Stephen I. Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1296 
(2012), http://aulawreview.org/pdfs/61/61-5/Vladeck.website.pdf.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Jack Goldsmith, Reflections on Government Lawyering, 205 MIL. L. REV. 192, 196 (2010). 
 48. 345 U.S. 1. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Id. at 2–3. 
 51. Id. at 3. 
 52. Id. at 3–4. 
 53. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 5–6. 
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Scholar Louis Fisher asserts that there “was a reason for the government 
to withhold the accident report from [the trial judge].”54  According to 
Fisher, it was not secrets that would be compromised; rather, the “report 
revealed clear negligence on the part of the Air Force, which had not 
installed heat shields and had failed to brief the civilian engineers before the 
flight on the use of parachutes and emergency aircraft evacuation.”55  Not 
knowing what the report actually said, the Supreme Court upheld the 
government’s position, finding that “when the formal claim of privilege was 
filed by the Secretary of the Air Force, under circumstances indicating a 
reasonable possibility that military secrets were involved, there was 
certainly a sufficient showing of privilege to cut off further demand for the 
documents.”56 
The story does not, however, end there.  In the year 2000, a daughter of 
one of the civilians killed in the crash discovered the declassified accident 
report for sale on the Internet.
57
  Subsequent examination of it confirmed 
that no classified information or equipment had been involved in the crash, 
and the plaintiffs sought to reopen the case based on the apparent fraud on 
the court.
58
  However, “[d]espite this showing of apparent government 
misconduct” the Supreme Court eventually denied a coram nobis petition 
for further review.
59
  In subsequent litigation, the plaintiffs were “denied 
relief because they were unable to show that government officials in 1953 
had committed intentional fraud on the court.”60 
Nevertheless, the Reynolds opinion has been severely criticized.  Fisher 
argues: 
The Supreme Court in Reynolds accepted at face value the 
government’s assertion that the accident report and survivors’ 
statements contained state secrets.  That assertion was false.  By 
accepting the government’s claim and by not examining the 
  
 54. Louis Fischer, The State Secrets Privilege: Relying on Reynolds, 122 POL. SCI. Q. 385, 399 
(2007), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/452.pdf.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10–11. 
 57. See Michael Freedman, Daughters of the Cold War, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Jan./Feb. 2004), 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2004/story_freedman_janfeb04.msp.  Cf. BARRY 
SIEGEL, CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE (2008) (chronicling the decades-long search for the truth that took place 
after the plane crash). 
 58. See id. 
 59. DYCUS, supra note 40, at 158 (citing In re Herring, 539 U.S. 940 (2003)). 
 60. Id. (citing Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1123 
(2006)). 
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documents, the Court appeared to function as an arm of the 
executive branch and failed to exercise independent judgment.
61
 
As it happens, the state secrets privilege has recently come under 
scrutiny, as some in Congress believe the privilege is being abused.
62
  
Accordingly, legislation is being introduced designed “to counter federal 
judges who routinely accept the government’s privilege assertion on face 
value without any inquiry, sometimes without viewing any classified 
material to support the government’s position.”63 
It is impossible at this point in time to really understand the thinking of 
the government lawyers involved in the Reynolds case, and to 
rationalizeconsistent with the Model Ruleshow they justified their 
conduct, which suggests, at a minimum, a lack of “candor.”64 
In any event, Reynolds underlines the importance, as the ABA Preamble 
says, of the self-governing character of the legal profession.
65
  Given the 
nature of national security issues, we cannot expect the courts to always 
exercise oversight and authority contemplated by the Model Rules, if for no 
other reason than the opaque character of much national security law 
litigation.  In the end, for the national security law practitioner especially, 
compliance with ethical standards necessitates individual lawyers’ “self-
governing.” 
c. The Lawyer as a Zealous Advocate 
As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under 
the rules of the adversary system.
66
 
  
 61. Fisher, supra note 54, at 401. 
 62. David Kravets, Much-Abused ‘State Secrets Privilege’ Under Fire in Congress, WIRED (June 
25, 2012), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/06/state-secrets-revamp/.   
 63. Id. 
 64. See MODEL RULES, supra note 16, R. 3.3. 
 65. See id., Preamble and Scope, ¶ 10. 
 66. Id. ¶ 2. The full paragraph reads as follows: 
 
As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer 
provides a client with an informed understanding of the client’s legal rights and obligations 
and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s 
position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result 
advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others. As 
an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client’s legal affairs and reporting about them to 
the client or to others.  
 
Id. 
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The Preamble speaks to a cardinal—and indispensable—responsibility 
of lawyers: zealous representation.
67
  Importantly, the Model Rules 
juxtapose the lawyer’s function as an advocate among other functions that 
the lawyer may serve in the context of representation.  Though sometime 
misunderstood, this requirement for zealous advocacy does not mean that a 
lawyer must, or even can, do anything, anytime, that the client desires.  As 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor maintains, “[t]he hardest thing you must 
accept as an ethical, moral lawyer is that it is not your job to win for your 
client at all costs.”68  The case of Lynne Stewart is an example of a national 
security case where the attorney in question lost sight of Justice O’Connor’s 
admonition, and suffered for it. 
Ms. Stewart was a self-described “radical human rights attorney”69 with 
a “reputation for defending unpopular clients and causes.”70  One of those 
clients was Omar Abdel Rahman, the “blind Sheik” who was convicted of 
various terrorism-related offenses including plotting to blow up the World 
Trade Center.
71
  As part of her representation, Ms. Stewart was required to 
agree to “special administrative measures” (“SAMs”) in order to get access 
to her imprisoned client.
72
  Among other things, these SAMs prohibited her 
from using her “meetings, correspondence or phone calls with Abdel 
Rahman to pass messages between third parties (including, but not limited 
to, the media) and Abdel Rahman.”73 
In 2005, Ms. Stewart was tried for several offenses arising out her 
representation of Rahman, including violating the SAMs by smuggling 
messages from Rahman to an Egyptian militant group, al-Gama’a, mostly 
about a ceasefire that the group had declared with regard to its violent 
efforts to overthrow the Egyptian government.
74
  In her defense Stewart 
insisted that she was merely acting “zealously” for her client.  Convicted 
and sentenced to twenty-eight months in prison, Stewart defiantly declared 
that she “can do that [prison term] standing on [her] head.”75  In addition, 
when asked if she would do anything differently, she replied, “I don’t—I’d 
like to think I would not do anything differently . . . . I made these decisions 
  
 67. See id. 
 68. Sandra Day O’Connor, On Being Ethical Lawyers, CLARK MEMORANDUM, Spring 2008, at 5, 
http://www.jrcls.org/publications/clark_memo/sections/s08/cmS08_oconnor.pdf.  
 69. About, JUSTICE FOR LYNNE STEWART (May 30, 2010), http://lynnestewart.org/about-lynne/. 
 70. Benjamin Weiser, 10-Year Sentence for Lawyer in Terrorism Case Is Upheld, N. Y. TIMES, 
June 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/nyregion/lynne-stewarts-10-year-prison-sentence-
is-upheld.html. 
 71. U.S. v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 103-04 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1094 (2000). 
 72. U.S. v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 73. Id. at 100. 
 74. U.S. v. Stewart, 686 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 75. Id. at 165. 
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based on my understanding of what the client needed, what a lawyer was 
expected to do . . . . I would do it again. I might handle it a little differently, 
but I would do it again.”76 
On appeal, Stewart reiterated her claim that she had been simply acting 
“zealously” to represent her client.  However, the court rejected this 
contention, finding that 
the jury had a reasonable basis on which to disbelieve this, and to 
“disbelieve that zealous representation included filing false 
affirmations, hiding from prison guards the delivery of messages to 
Abdel Rahman, and the dissemination of responses by him that 
were obtained through dishonesty.”  Moreover, even if Stewart 
acted with an intent to represent her client zealously, a rational jury 
could nonetheless have concluded that Stewart simultaneously acted 
with an intent to defraud the government.  A genuinely held intent 
to represent a client “zealously” is not necessarily inconsistent with 
criminal intent.
77
 
In fact, the appeals court would not affirm the sentence, returning it to 
the trial court for further consideration because the appellate judges could 
not “conclude that the mitigating factors” were sufficient to justify the 
original twenty-eight-month sentence “in light of the seriousness of her 
criminal conduct, her responsibilities as a member of the bar, and her role as 
counsel for Abdel Rahman.”78 
In a stunning turn of events, the trial court re-sentenced Stewart to ten 
years, the trial judge finding that the original sentence was not adequate 
because, among other things, she “abused her position as a lawyer.”79  That 
sentence was affirmed on appeal, as the judges ruled that not only was it 
lawful to consider Stewart’s post-conviction statements of bravado in the re-
sentencing, but also that she 
persisted in exhibiting what seems to be a stark inability to 
understand the seriousness of her crimes, the breadth and depth of 
the danger in which they placed the lives and safety of unknown 
  
 76. Id. 
 77. Stewart, 590 F .3d at 110 (quoting U.S. v. Sattar, 395 F. Supp.2d 79, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). 
 78. Id. at 99. 
 79. Scott Shifrel & James Fanelli, Lynn Stewart, 70-year-old radical lawyer, sentenced to 10 
years in prison for aiding bomb plotter, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 15, 2010), 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-07-15/local/27070085_1_koeltl-defense-lawyers-terrorism-case.  
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innocents, and the extent to which they constituted an abuse of her 
trust and privilege as a member of the bar.
80
 
In a pre-sentencing letter to the trial judge, Stewart gave an inkling of 
what may have been her key shortcomings.
81
  She spoke of seeing her job as 
a lawyer as that of “caring for the whole client,” to include “giving them 
money for food or their families,” and “visiting them on holidays”—
activities beyond the usual professional responsibilities, and problematic 
ones in an era of sophisticated and exploitive international terrorists.
82
 
Stewart indicated that she believed that “her stature in the legal 
community[,]” along with what she implies was general acceptance by the 
government of her way of practice in prior cases, would somehow exempt 
her from being viewed as having broken the law in the Rahman case.
83
  
Perhaps most importantly, she admitted that “representing this convicted 
terrorist was still uncharted territory in the years 1997–2001” and that “what 
might have been legitimately tolerated in 2000–2001, was after 9/11, 
interpreted differently and considered criminal.”84 
Clearly, the idea that terrorism and other national security cases are 
“different” and viewed with the utmost seriousness is a lesson that all 
lawyers would do well to internalize from the Lynne Stewart case.  It is 
another manifestation of the precept that government has no more 
compelling interest “than the security of the Nation,”85 and that fact may 
well operate to diminish tolerance for behavior that might otherwise be 
excused. 
d. Competence 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.  
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.
86
 
Competence for the national security law practitioner can be quite 
challenging.  Almost by definition, national security matters are not the stuff 
  
 80. Stewart, 686 F.3d at 181 (emphasis added). 
 81. Letter from Lynne F. Stewart to the Honorable John G. Koeltl, U.S. Dist. Court Judge, 
Southern Dist. N.Y. (Jan. 26, 2006), available at http://www.lynnestewart.org/Stewart%20Letter 
%20(Ex%201)%20scanned.pdf. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. at 307. 
 86. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, R. 1.1. 
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of most civilian experience.  A contracts lawyer may have personal 
experience in buying a home or car that may familiarize him or her with 
issues arising in a similar transaction by a client.  Contrast that with the 
national security law practitioner who may find himself or herself 
deliberating over a decision to kill another human being, or hundreds.  
Furthermore, some tasks may require considerable technical knowledge in 
order to utilize complex equipment in command centers, or to understand 
the weapons, warfare, and warriors of the national security discipline.  
Accordingly, specialized training is indispensable in order to function 
effectively, especially where high-technology weaponry is involved.
87
 
The consequences of a lack of training can be serious.  The case of 
Captain Randy Stone, the Marine lawyer accused of failing to properly 
report and investigate the Haditha incident, is instructive.
88
  Although he 
was “responsible for handling investigations and training Marines in the 
military’s laws of war,” Stone said “he received almost zero training for his 
job before joining the battalion in Iraq in September 2005.”89 
National security law clients may have very high expectations about 
what they want a lawyer to understand about this “business.”  Lieutenant 
General Michael C. Short, USAF (Ret.), who commanded air operations 
against Serbia
90
 in the 1990s, advised: 
I would give an up-and-coming young operational lawyer wearing 
the uniform in defense of this country [the following advice:] 
Understand what your commander is up against.  Understand and 
participate in the development of his rules of engagement.  
Understand what special instructions he is providing as 
supplemental to his rules of engagement, to his troops in field, or 
his men and women at sea, or his men and women in the air.
91
 
  
 87. See, e.g., Charles J. Dunlap, Come the Revolution: A Legal Perspective on Air Operations in 
Iraq Since 2003, in ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 141 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 2010), and reprint-
ed in 86 THE WAR IN IRAQ: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 139–54 (Raul A “Pete” Pedroza & Naval War College 
Press eds., 2010), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/ 2182/. 
 88. See McChesney, supra note 17; Press Release, supra note 19. 
 89. Rick Rogers, Marine tells why no Haditha-case probe, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May 16, 
2007, http://www.utsandiego.com/uniontrib/20070516/news_1mi16haditha.html.  
 90. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force 
After-Action Report 20 (Jan. 31. 2000), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/kosovoaa/kaa 
r02072000.pdf.  
 91. Lieutenant General Michael Short, USAF (Ret.), Operation Allied Force from the Perspec-
tive of the NATO Air Commander, in 78 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, LEGAL AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF 
NATO’S KOSOVO CAMPAIGN 19 (Andru E. Wall ed., 2002) [hereinafter Operation Allied Force], 
http://www.au.af.mil/AU/AWC/AWCGATE/navy/kosovo_legal.pdf.  For another discussion of the role 
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A national security law practitioner must, in many instances, have a 
deep enough level of understanding of the means and methods of national 
security activities to be able to offer lawful alternatives when possible.  
Offering timely alternatives is an indispensable aspect of this kind of 
practice, and is a quality that can earn the trust of the client. 
When national security law practitioners demonstrate authentic 
competence, “client” commanders have greater faith in them, and will more 
readily incorporate them into the decision-making process.  When that 
occurs, real dividends result.  For example, when a Human Rights Watch 
analyst told the New York Times, in 2008, that the Air Force had “‘all but 
eliminated civilian casualties in Afghanistan’”92 in strikes that are a product 
of the deliberate planning process, the paper also pointed out that “Air Force 
lawyers vet all the airstrikes approved by the operational air 
commanders.”93 
Again, few things are more important for a “competent” national 
security law practitioner than a comprehensive and in-depth knowledge of 
not just the law, but also the “client” and his or her very unique “business.” 
e. Special Conflicts of Interest for Former and Current Government 
Officers and Employees 
[A] lawyer who has formerly served as a public officer or employee 
of the government . . . shall not otherwise represent a client in 
connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated 
personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless 
the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, 
confirmed in writing, to the representation.
94
 
  
of lawyers in that conflict from a commander’s perspective, see generally WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING 
MODERN WAR: BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AND THE FUTURE OF COMBAT 175, 179, 461 (2001). 
 92. Thom Shanker, Civilian Risks Curbing Airstrikes in Afghan War, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/23/world/asia/23military.html (quoting Marc Garlasco, Senior Mili-
tary Analyst, Human Rights Watch). 
 93. Id.  
 94. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, R. 1.11.  The full paragraph (and the following paragraph) 
states: 
 
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer who has formerly served as a 
public officer or employee of the government: 
(1) is subject to Rule 1.9(c); and 
(2) shall not otherwise represent a client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer 
participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the 
appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the 
representation. 
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This is an area of the Model Rules that most involves the civilian sector, 
and particularly those who have previously served in government.  It can 
ensnare even very highly respected and knowledgeable lawyers.  An 
illustrative example with a national security law dimension is the case of 
Abraham D. Sofaer, a still much-admired and valued lawyer.
95
 
Sofaer was the Legal Advisor to the State Department from 1985 to 
1990.
96
  In 1988, a bomb exploded on Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, 
Scotland, killing 270 people, including 189 Americans.
97
  A Libyan 
intelligence agent was later convicted for his part in what was determined to 
be one of the worst acts of state-sponsored terrorism in recent years.
98
  In 
2003, Libya, as a result of pressure from international sanctions, accepted 
“responsibility for the actions of its officials and [agreed to] payment of 
appropriate compensation to the victims’ families.”99  The compensation 
was reported to amount to $1.5 billion and its payment “clear[ed] the way 
for the full normalization of relations between Washington and Tripoli.”100 
After he left government and entered private practice, Sofaer undertook 
the representation of “the government of Libya in connection with criminal 
  
(b) When a lawyer is disqualified from representation under paragraph (a), no lawyer in a 
firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue 
representation in such a matter unless: 
(1) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is 
apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and 
(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to enable it to 
ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule. 
(c) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the 
lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person acquired when the 
lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests 
are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material 
disadvantage of that person. As used in this Rule, the term “confidential government 
information” means information that has been obtained under governmental authority and 
which, at the time this Rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to 
the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose and which is not otherwise available to the 
public. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation 
in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the 
matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom. 
 
Id. 
 95. Mr. Sofaer is currently the George P. Shultz Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and National 
Security Affairs at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.  Abraham D. Sofaer, HOOVER INSTITUTION, 
http://www.hoover.org/fellows/10685 (last visited Aug. 28, 2012).  
 96. See id.  
 97. Jeffrey Fleishman & Glen Johnson, Lockerbie bomber dies in Libya, LOS ANGELES TIMES, 
May 21, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/21/world/la-fg-libya-lockerbie-bomber-20120521.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Background Note: Libya, U.S. DEP’T ST. (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/ 
5425.htm. 
 100. Kirit Radia, Pan Am 103 Families Finally Compensated, ABC NEWS (Oct. 31, 2008), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=6158491&page=1. 
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and civil disputes and litigation arising from the [Pan Am] bombing.”101  As 
a result, the Board on Professional Responsibility ordered Sofaer to receive 
an informal admonition for having violated Rule 1.11(a) of the District of 
Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct by accepting employment 
“substantially related” to a “matter” in which he participated personally and 
substantially as the Legal Advisor for the State Department.
102
 
In his defense, Sofaer vigorously contested the precise meaning of the 
various terms in the rule, and offered several other explanations justifying 
his actions.
103
  However, the District of Colombia Court of Appeals adopted 
the Board report.
104
  In that report it was emphasized that it found a 
violation of the rules not because Sofaer “undertook to represent an 
unpopular client” or because of “the appearance of impropriety that caused 
public condemnation of Respondent’s private representation of Libya”;105  
rather, the Board 
[D]id not believe that [the rule] allows a government lawyer to be 
briefed in the course of his official duties about a particular, 
sensitive investigation into a discrete event, so that he can provide 
legal advice, thereby learning important confidential information, 
provide substantial and personal legal assistance concerning the 
government’s efforts, then leave the government and represent a 
suspect in the same investigation.
106
 
The court also found Sofaer’s activities “personal and substantial” and 
noted that they did not become “insubstantial” simply because “the legal 
judgment was easily arrived at or because the government subsequently 
concluded that Pan Am’s theory of government complicity was 
unsupported.”107  Finally, the court concluded that, while it may be possible 
for a former government lawyer to “limit the objectives of a representation 
with client consent” so as to avoid conflict (and emphasized that it did “not 
question the sincerity of respondent’s belief that the representation could be 
insulated, factually and ethically, from the investigation and diplomatic 
efforts of which he had been part”), it nevertheless found the efforts to do so 
in this instance were inadequate.
108
 
  
 101. In re Sofaer, 728 A.2d 625, 626 (D.C. 1999). 
 102. Id. at 630. 
 103. See id. at 627–28. 
 104. See id. at 626. 
 105. Id. at 651–52. 
 106. Sofaer, 728 A.2d at 651–52. 
 107. Id. at 627. 
 108. Id. at 628.  See also Opinion 343: Application of the “Substantial Relationship” Test When 
Attorneys Participate in Only Discrete Aspects of a New Matter, DC BAR, 
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An important lesson of the Sofaer case can be found in the court’s 
observation that Sofaer did not (as any lawyer could have) “solicit the views 
of his or her former agency concerning the proposed private legal 
undertaking” or “consult with ethics advisers in his or her law firm . . . or 
with the Legal Ethics Committee of the Bar.”109 
f. Diligence 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client.
110
 
Do the time-sensitive exigencies of national security law “matter” in 
ethical decision making?  Perhaps the real issue for the national security law 
practitioner is to determine what is “reasonable” diligence under the 
circumstances of a national security crisis.  Unfortunately, no database or 
treatise defines “reasonable” in the myriad of situations that national 
security law practitioners face.  In fact, many issues may be ones of first 
impression, so there may well be a lack of historical precedent to rely upon. 
Time pressure can be very real.  In a statement submitted in connection 
with David Margolis’ examination of the OPR conclusion that the two OLC 
attorneys, John Yoo and Jay Bybee, violated ethical rules in the opinions 
about enhanced interrogation techniques that many consider torture, 
Professor Jack Goldsmith contends: 
OPR is not looking at the OLC opinions with the same time 
constraints as the lawyers who wrote the opinions; instead OPR has 
taken nearly five years and still has not rendered a judgment.  The 
OLC layers did not have this luxury.  Perhaps more important, OPR 
is looking at the OLC opinions not in the context of the threat and 
danger in which they were written, but rather in what former 
Deputy Attorney General James Comey once described as “the 
perfect, and brutally unfair, vision of hindsight.”111 
  
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion343.cfm (last visited Aug. 29, 
2012). 
 109. Sofaer, 728 A.2d at 629.  For a good discussion of the rules relating to potential conflicts for 
lawyers leaving government, see Stacy M. Ludwig, The Revolving Door: Professional Responsibility 
Considerations for Attorneys Entering or Leaving the Department of Justice, 57 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ 
BULLETIN,  Sept. 2009, at 4,  available at http://www.justice.gov/usaoeousa/foia_reading_room/usab 
5704.pdf.  
 110. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, R. 1.3.   
 111. Memorandum from David Margolis, supra note 11.  
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In its guidance on ethical decision making, the Department of Defense 
Joint Ethics Regulation advises: “The stress from the problem urges speedy 
solutions.  However, hasty decisions usually create problems of their own.  
Take the time to gather all necessary information.  Ask questions, demand 
proof when appropriate, check your assumptions.”112 
Taking “the time to gather all necessary information” may be fine as 
hortatory and aspirational statement, but is often impractical given the 
velocity of many if not most national security issues.  Hard decisions often 
must be made on less than ideal information.  Judge James Baker, a former 
National Security Council member, observes that today’s national security 
attorneys may not have much time for deliberation.
113
  “For a variety of 
reasons,” he says, “relating to the nature and multiplicity of transnational 
and state threats, combined with the devastating potential of WMD, 
questions of whether to resort to force and the methods and means of force 
will pop-up and require immediate decision.”114 
Of course, when time to study an issue is available, it can make a real 
difference.  In a Human Rights Watch study about operations in 
Afghanistan, it was found that civilian casualties “rarely occur during 
planned airstrikes on suspected Taliban targets” but rather “almost always 
occurred during the fluid, rapid-response strikes, often carried out in 
support of ground troops.”115 
The “time crunch” of many national security issues highlights the 
importance of advance preparation.  The ability to make quick decisions 
much depends not just upon an in-depth understanding of the law, but also 
upon thorough familiarity with the context in which it must be applied.  As 
explained with relation to the ethical rule about competence, the ability to 
be diligent in a national security law practice requires the attorneys involved 
to make a study of the means and methods of national security operations. 
As discussed elsewhere in this Article, diligence in the national security 
law context may impose a responsibility to conduct a careful after-action 
examination to ensure that decisions made in—literally—the heat of battle 
were the right ones. 
  
 112. U.S. Dep’t of Defense Regulation 5500.7-R, § 12-501d, available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs 
/directives/corres/pdf/550007r.pdf (emphasis added). 
 113. James E. Baker, LBJ’s Ghost: A Contextual Approach to Targeting Decisions and the Com-
mander in Chief, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 407, 424 (2003). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Human Rights Watch, “Troops in Contact”: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan 4 
(Sept. 2008) (emphasis added), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan09 
08web_0.pdf. 
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g. Confidentiality 
A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is 
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation . . . A 
lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: . . . to 
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm . . . 
[or] (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that 
is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another . . . .
116
 
The case of former Navy Lieutenant Matthew Diaz is instructive with 
respect to the complications of confidentiality in the national security 
context.  Diaz was a Navy Judge Advocate assigned to Guantánamo, Cuba, 
not as part of the prosecution or defense teams involved in military 
commissions’ cases, but rather as part of the installation support legal 
office.
117
  In that capacity he served as the point of contact at Guantánamo 
for requests from Barbara Olshansky, an attorney working for the Center for 
Constitutional Rights (“CCR”) in New York City, who was seeking names 
and information regarding detainees.
118
 
  
 116. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, R. 1.6.  The full rule reads as follows: 
 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the 
client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; 
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to 
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in 
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services; 
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property 
of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission 
of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services; 
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules; 
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the 
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the 
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations 
in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client; or 
(6) to comply with other law or a court order. 
 
Id. 
 117. U.S. v. Diaz, 69 M.J. 127, 129 (C.A.A.F. 2010),  http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/ 
opinions/2009SepTerm/090535.pdf. 
 118. See id. 
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After a decision was made to not provide the information to Olshansky, 
Diaz concluded that the “government was ‘stonewalling’ over the release of 
the names.”119  Consequently, Diaz printed off a listing of 550 detainees, 
and sent it anonymously in a Valentine’s card to Olshansky.120  Suspecting 
the list was classified, Olshansky contacted an attorney and eventually 
turned the list over to government authorities who launched an 
investigation, which nabbed Diaz.
121
 
According to his defense counsel, Diaz believed it was his “obligation 
as a lawyer and an American to abide by the Constitution when he felt the 
government did not.”122  However, the military judge in the case concluded 
“that none of the evidence proffered by Appellant supported his argument 
that he was required to release classified information based on his duties as 
a commissioned officer, his ethical obligations as a judge advocate, or his 
ethical obligations as a licensed attorney.”123  Although his attorney 
admitted that Diaz was “stupid, imprudent and sneaky, if you want, about 
the way he sent it off,” he nevertheless insisted Diaz “didn’t mean to harm 
his country.”124  Still, Diaz was convicted and sentenced to six months 
confinement and dismissal from the Navy.
125
 
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces affirmed the conviction and 
sentence.
126
  A footnote in the court’s opinion is telling.  In it, the court 
described the process available to Navy lawyers who believe they are 
confronting an ethical conundrum.  Referring to Navy instruction on 
professional responsibility, the court points out that it “recommends four 
specific steps a covered attorney might take, including ‘referring the matter 
to, or seeking guidance from, higher authority in the chain of command.’”127  
Of course, Diaz had made no attempt to resolve his concerns in this way.
128
 
The lesson here may be that as important as it is for national security 
practitioners to be self-governing, it does not mean that “self-help” in the 
area of ethics is necessarily appropriate.  Reaching out to experts as 
  
 119. Andrew Scutro, JAG gets 6 months, dismissal in Gitmo case, NAVY TIMES, May 18, 2007, 
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2007/05/navy_diaz_sentence_070518w/ (statement of Matthew Diaz, 
Lieutenant Commander). 
 120. Diaz, 69 M.J. at 130. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 136. 
 124. Scutro, supra note 119 (statement of Patrick McLain, Defense Attorney to Matthew Diaz). 
 125. See Diaz, 69 M.J. at 129. 
 126. Id. at 130. 
 127. Id. at 136 n.11 (quoting Dep’t of the Navy, Judge Advocate Instr. 5803.1C, Professional 
Conduct of Attorneys Practicing Under the Cognizance and Supervision of the Judge Advocate General, 
Enclosure (1): Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13(b)(3) (Nov. 9, 2004)). 
 128. See generally id. at 127. 
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provided by ethics rules is especially important in the complex arena of 
national security law.  Here the facts did not support Diaz’s belief (however 
earnestly held) that he was in an ethical conflict, which strongly suggests 
that consultation with superiors and others qualified to offer advice might 
have avoided the career implosion he underwent. 
h. Client Relations 
A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the 
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.
129
 
  
 129. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, R. 1.6.  The full rule reads as follows: 
 
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting 
through its duly authorized constituents. 
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated 
with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related 
to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation 
of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in 
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary 
in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not 
necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to 
higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the 
highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law. 
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if 
(1) despite the lawyer’s efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority 
that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and 
appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and 
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in 
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to 
the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the 
organization. 
(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer’s 
representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the 
organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the organization 
against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. 
(e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the 
lawyer’s actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c), or who withdraws under 
circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those 
paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the 
organization’s highest authority is informed of the lawyer’s discharge or withdrawal. 
(f) In dealing with an organization’s directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or 
other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the 
constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing. 
(g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, 
employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 
1.7. If the organization’s consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the 
consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual 
who is to be represented, or by the shareholders. 
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In a national security law practice, the “who is the client” query can be 
a complicated question.  Harold Koh, the legal advisor to the State 
Department, lists a number of individuals among those who he characterizes 
as his “extraordinary” clients.130  These include, for example, Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton, and the President.
131
  Such individual representation 
is, however, the exception, not the rule for most governmental national 
security law practitioners. 
The District of Columbia Rules of Professional Responsibility, for 
example, provide that the “client of the government lawyer is the agency 
that employs the lawyer unless expressly provided to the contrary by 
appropriate law, regulation, or order.”132  Some agencies make this explicit.  
  
Id.  
 130. Speech, Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Obama Administration and 
International Law, at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington D.C. 
(Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. 
 131. See id.  
 132. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(k) (2006), available at 
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/rules_of_professional_conduct/amended_rules/rule
_one/rule01_06.cfm.  The commentary to the rule provides as follows: 
 
        Government Lawyers 
 
[36] Subparagraph (e)(2) was revised, and paragraph (k) was added, to address the unique 
circumstances raised by attorney-client relationships within the government.  
[37] Subparagraph (e)(2)(A) applies to both private and government attorney-client 
relationships. Subparagraph (e)(2)(B) applies to government lawyers only. It is designed to 
permit disclosures that are not required by law or court order under Rule 1.6(e)(2)(A), but 
which the government authorizes its attorneys to make in connection with their professional 
services to the government. Such disclosures may be authorized or required by statute, 
executive order, or regulation, depending on the constitutional or statutory powers of the 
authorizing entity. If so authorized or required, subparagraph (e)(2)(B) governs.  
[38] The term “agency” in paragraph (j) includes, inter alia, executive and independent 
departments and agencies, special commissions, committees of the legislature, agencies of the 
legislative branch such as the Government Accountability Office, and the courts to the extent 
that they employ lawyers (e.g., staff counsel) to counsel them. The employing agency has 
been designated the client under this rule to provide a commonly understood and easily 
determinable point for identifying the government client. 
[39] Government lawyers may also be assigned to provide an individual with counsel or 
representation in circumstances that make clear that an obligation of confidentiality runs 
directly to that individual and that subparagraph (e)(2)(A), not (e)(2)(B), applies. It is, of 
course, acceptable in this circumstance for a government lawyer to make disclosures about 
the individual representation to supervisors or others within the employing governmental 
agency so long as such disclosures are made in the context of, and consistent with, the 
agency’s representation program. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 50.15 and 50.16. The relevant 
circumstances, including the agreement to represent the individual, may also indicate whether 
the individual client to whom the government lawyer is assigned will be deemed to have 
granted or denied informed consent to disclosures to the lawyer’s employing agency. 
Examples of such representation include representation by a public defender, a government 
lawyer representing a defendant sued for damages arising out of the performance of the 
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In the U.S. Air Force, the Rules of Professional Conduct state that “[e]xcept 
when authorized to represent an individual client or the government of the 
United States, an Air Force judge advocate or other Air Force lawyer 
represents the Department of the Air Force acting through its authorized 
officials.”133  The explanatory notes point out that when “an Air Force 
official, member, or employee, acting within the scope of his or her official 
duties, communicates with an Air Force lawyer, the communication is 
confidential [and] . . . . [u]nder these circumstances, the official, member or 
employee is, in essence, the Air Force.”134 
As both military officers and legal professionals,  attorneys in the armed 
forces face practical challenges.  It is easy in the military for a commander 
to assume that the uniformed lawyer assigned to his unit is also “his” 
personal counsel, notwithstanding circumstances where the Air Force’s 
interests conflict with those of individuals, including commanders.  Thus, it 
is especially important that this be made clear before there is any 
misunderstanding about client confidences.
135
 
The “who is the client?” question can become even more complicated 
for military lawyers and others assigned to commands composed of 
international partners.  Even though, for example, an attorney may be 
assigned as a legal advisor to a coalition operation, the client will remain the 
attorney’s sponsoring organization (e.g., the U.S. Air Force). 
There is a practical issue as well—few lawyers would be competent to 
advise other national contingents on their national responsibilities, not to 
mention their international responsibilities under treaty law where the 
interpretation may be subject to particular reservations and other 
qualifications by a specific coalition partner.  It is imperative, then, that a 
lawyer so assigned make clear the limits of the legal assistance he or she 
can provide. 
Like the Navy,
136
 the Air Force has a process by which military 
attorneys can seek ethical and other guidance from senior lawyers, 
  
defendant’s government employment, and a military lawyer representing a court-martial 
defendant. 
 
Id.  
 133. AIR FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL CORPS, RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) 
(2005) [hereinafter AIR FORCE RULES], available at http://www.caaflog.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/AirForceRulesofProfessionalConduct.pdf. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See, e.g., id., R. 1.13(d) (“In dealing with Air Force officials, members, employees, or other 
persons associated with the Air Force, a lawyer shall explain that the Air Force is the lawyer’s client 
when it is apparent that the Air Force’s interests are adverse to those of the officials, members, or em-
ployees with whom the lawyer is dealing.”). 
 136. See Diaz, 69 M.J. at 136 n.11. 
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especially when confronted with situations where the attorney believes that 
an Air Force official “is acting, intends to act, or refuses to act in an official 
matter in a way that is either a violation of the person’s legal obligations to 
the Air Force or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to 
the Air Force.”137 
This access to advice and guidance from senior attorneys is protected by 
law.  For example, the Uniform Code of Military Justice specifically states 
that military legal officers are “entitled to communicate directly with the 
staff judge advocate or legal officer of a superior or subordinate command, 
or with the Judge Advocate General.”138  The ability to circumvent, if 
necessary, the normal chain of command is no small prerogative given that 
the “the Armed Services comprise a hierarchical society, which is based on 
military rank.”139 
The law also helps assure the organization gets candid, apolitical legal 
advice from military lawyers.  In fact, the law prohibits any interference 
from any “officer or employee of the Department of Defense” with respect 
to the rendering of “independent legal advice.”140 Furthermore, in order to 
reinforce the independence of the provision of legal advice from uniformed 
attorneys, the law also designates the Judge Advocate General, as opposed 
to any non-legal officer, as responsible for directing “the officers of the Air 
Force designated as judge advocates in the performance of their duties.”141 
All of these statutory provisions help ensure that a military lawyer can carry 
out his or her ethical responsibilities to the organizational client without 
running afoul of the duties and responsibilities of a commissioned officer.  
They are also invaluable in ensuring the delivery of independent and candid 
advice, as discussed below. 
  
 137. AIR FORCE RULES, supra note 133, R. 1.13(b). 
 138. 10 U.S.C § 806 (2011). 
 139. U.S. v. Means, 10 M.J. 162, 165 (C.M.A. 1981). 
 140. 10 U.S.C § 8037(f) provides: 
 
(f) No officer or employee of the Department of Defense may interfere with— 
(1) the ability of the Judge Advocate General to give independent legal advice to the 
Secretary of the Air Force or the Chief of Staff of the Air Force; or 
(2) the ability of officers of the Air Force who are designated as judge advocates who are 
assigned or attached to, or performing duty with, military units to give independent legal 
advice to commanders. 
 
10 U.S.C § 8037(f) (2011).  
 141. Id. § 8037(c)(1).  
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i. Lawyer as Advisor 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent 
professional judgment and render candid advice.  In rendering 
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political 
factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.142 
This section is one of the most important parts of the Model Rules for 
the national security law practitioner.  The very nature of many national 
security issues is such that their proper resolution can only be had when a 
range of factors—such as those listed in the rule—are brought to bear on the 
client’s situation.  Yet there are some national security lawyers who 
perceive their role rather narrowly.  Judge Alberto Gonzales, the former 
Attorney General who has been soundly critiqued for his part in the 
rendering of suspect advice on coercive interrogation techniques, said in an 
interview for Esquire magazine, “Putting my lawyer hat aside, the notion 
that we‘d have to get legalistic about torture, yeah, can be offensive to me.  
It’s inconsistent with American values.  But as a lawyer—as a lawyer—you 
have to try to put meaning to the words passed by Congress.”143 
Actually, if the law is truly inconsistent with “American values” then 
the law itself is suspect, and the national security lawyer needs to make this 
clear to the client.   Perspective matters.  In a 2006 essay entitled “Cooler 
Heads: The Difference between the President’s Lawyers and the 
Military’s,” Professor Richard Schragger illustrated this importance of 
perspective.  In discussing the dispute at that time between military lawyers 
(who eschewed coercive interrogation techniques and other actions 
designed to eviscerate the Geneva Conventions and certain aspects of 
international and domestic law) and the then-Administration’s civilian 
attorneys who advocated just such approaches, Schragger concluded: 
[M]ilitary lawyers understand that when you ask human beings to 
kill other human beings, rules of decency are required.  War does 
not erase the line between legal and illegal killings, legal and illegal 
acts—war accentuates it.  Establishing and policing that line 
becomes even more important when your client is the one likely to 
cross it. 
 
  
 142. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, R. 2.1. 
 143. John H. Richardson, Alberto Gonzales: What I’ve Learned, ESQUIRE (Dec. 9, 2009, 6:30 
AM), http://www.esquire.com/features/what-ive-learned/alberto-gonzales-torture-quotes-0110. 
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Civilian lawyers may not appreciate this.  Civilian lawyers are 
educated and socialized into a legal culture that takes the rule of law 
for granted.  The stability of our legal system allows us to do what 
we do best: seek ways for our clients to avoid legal mishap. The law 
is something we need to strategize around because it often functions 
to limit our clients’ options, not serve them.144 
It is just these kinds of subtleties that can be vitally important in 
national security matters, and is a clear reason why the broader scope of 
advice a lawyer can provide is so important.  Moreover, it is vital for a 
national security practitioner not to underestimate the extreme pressure 
under which some clients must operate.  Consider the observation of a 
former senior military commander: 
When I go to my lawyers, I don’t ask, “okay, tell me how I can’t do 
this.” I go to my lawyers and say, “How can I do what I need to do 
and not go to jail? How can I do it legally? . . . The legal advisor 
has to understand that his job is to find a way through the 
interpretations and legal precedence for the things we have to do, so 
I can protect my people going out in harms’ way.”145 
Sensitivity to the often life-and-death nature of national security issues 
cannot be overemphasized, and it is one reason why the national security 
law practitioner needs to be prepared to bring to bear every relevant 
consideration to the decision-making process, legal and otherwise.  At the 
same time, however, the practitioner needs to keep in mind that there must 
be a clear distinction between legal advice, and advice that incorporates 
considerations that fall short of a legal mandate.  However, the lawyer’s 
recommendation need not yield to simply giving “meaning to the words 
passed by Congress.”146 
National security clients need more from their lawyers than mere rote 
recitations of the meanings of statutes.  Senator Lindsey Graham said in a 
2004 interview that the “military lawyer [JAG] is really the conscience of 
the military.”147  Similarly, Harold Koh said that his State Department 
  
 144. Richard C. Schragger, Cooler Heads: The difference between the president’s lawyers and the 
military’s, SLATE (Sept. 20, 2006, 5:10 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2150050/?nav/navoa. 
 145. Randon H. Draper, Interview with a JFACC: A Commander’s Perspective on the Legal 
Advisor’s Role, THE JAG WARRIOR, Autumn 2002, at 21–22. 
 146. See Richardson, supra note 143. 
 147. Interview with Lindsey Graham, FRONTLINE (Oct. 26, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages 
/frontline/shows/pentagon/interviews/graham.html.  
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attorneys serve as the “conscience for the U.S. Government with regard to 
international law.”148 
Koh goes on to explain that “one of the most important roles of the 
Legal Adviser is to advise the Secretary when a policy option being 
proposed is ‘lawful but awful.’”149  He then quotes one of his predecessors, 
Herman Pfleger, for the proposition that, “You should never say no to your 
client when the law and your conscience say yes; but you should never, ever 
say yes when your law and conscience say no.”150  This is advice the 
national security practitioner might find useful to keep in mind if confronted 
with a situation that is, as Judge Gonzales puts it, “inconsistent with 
American values.”151   
j. Conduct Before a Tribunal 
A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or 
law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact 
or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; (2) fail to 
disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling 
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the 
position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or (3) 
offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false . . . .
152
 
As we have already seen, the importance of candor for the national 
security practitioners is critical as so many of the cases involve either 
matters that are properly classified, or issues in which the courts depend 
upon the integrity of the government representations.  Unfortunately, history 
  
 148. Koh, supra note 130. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Richardson, supra note 143. 
 152. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, R. 3.3. The full paragraph (a) reads as follows: 
 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of 
material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; 
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the 
lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing 
counsel; or 
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a 
witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know 
of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, 
disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony 
of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. 
 
Id. 
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shows that reliance is not always justified.  Classic examples are the World 
War II Japanese internment cases, Korematsu v. U.S.
153
 and Hirabayashi v. 
U.S.
154
 
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, war hysteria 
eventually turned on thousands of Japanese-Americans living on the West 
Coast.
155
  Because they were suspected of being potential “fifth columnists” 
or spies, President Roosevelt issued an executive order authorizing military 
authorities to remove Japanese-Americans from areas near the coast.
156
  
Eventually, 100,000 were removed and sent to internment camps.
157
  The 
Japanese Internment Cases challenged these actions, but in both instances 
the government’s authority was upheld.158 
In 2011, however, Neal Katyal, the then Acting Solicitor General of the 
United States, made a series of disclosures that reflect poorly on the ethics 
of his World War II predecessor, Charles Fahy.
159
  Katyal reports that a 
critical intelligence document—the Ringle Report—“found that only a small 
percentage of Japanese Americans posed a potential security threat, and that 
the most dangerous were already known or in custody.”160  Even though the 
Solicitor General knew of this very significant information, he withheld it 
from the Supreme Court.
161
 
Instead, the Solicitor General “argued that it was impossible to 
segregate loyal Japanese Americans from disloyal ones.”162  He also failed 
to tell the Court that allegations “that Japanese Americans were using radio 
transmitters to communicate with enemy submarines off the West Coast, 
had been discredited by the FBI and FCC.”163  According to Katyal, “to 
make matters worse, [he then] relied on gross generalizations about 
Japanese Americans, such as that they were disloyal and motivated by 
‘racial solidarity.’”164 
  
 153. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 154. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 155. See generally id. at 113-14. 
 156. Executive Order 9066: The President Authorizes Japanese Relocation, HISTORY MATTERS, 
http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5154/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).  See also Exec. Order No. 9006, 7 
Fed. Reg. 1407, p.2 (Feb. 19, 1942). 
 157. Tracey Russo, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese 
American Internment Cases, THE JUSTICE BLOG (May 20, 2011), http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/ 
1346.  
 158. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. at 219; Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. at 105. 
 159. See Russo, supra note 157. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Russo, supra note 157. 
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This ethically horrific behavior by a lawyer holding such an important 
public office is hard to fathom, but does represent how a wartime mania can 
warp the thinking of the very people whom democracies depend upon to be 
paragons of composure and rational behavior.  Can we dismiss these cases 
as anomalies from more than half a century ago?  Consider the case of 
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd.
165
 
Al-Kidd involved a Kansas-born, former University of Idaho football 
player named Lavni T. Kidd who converted to Islam while in college and 
changed his name to Abdullah al-Kidd.
166
  After 9/11, al-Kidd was 
questioned by authorities about an acquaintance, a Saudi graduate student 
named Sami Omar al-Hussayen, who was suspected of using his computer 
skills to aid terrorists.
167
  Although he cooperated with the FBI when asked 
about al-Hussayen, al-Kidd was arrested on a “material witness” warrant in 
2003 as he boarded a plane to Saudi Arabia to take a course of study in 
Islam.
168
  The affidavits that the FBI used to obtain the warrant proved to be 
wildly inaccurate.
169
 
Al-Kidd was kept in jail for sixteen days and on supervised release until 
al-Hussayen’s trial concluded fourteen months later.170  According to the 
American Civil Liberties Union, while in federal custody, al-Kidd was 
“kept under extremely harsh conditions,” including being “kept awake for 
hours on end, with a bright light shining in his cell 24/7.”171  In addition, 
whenever he left his cell he was “shackled at the wrists, ankles, and waist” 
and at “one point, he was left naked for hours in plain view of other clothed 
prisoners and guards.”172  What is more, when released from jail, he was 
still “kept under restrictive conditions for months that forced him to 
abandon an educational scholarship and led to the breakdown of his 
marriage and career.” 173 
Importantly, al-Kidd was not the only Muslim-American treated this 
way.  According to the Associated Press, al-Kidd was one of “about 70 
men, almost all Muslims, who were arrested and held in the months and 
  
 165. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
 166. See al-Kidd v. Aschcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 167. See id. 
 168. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2011) (explaining the purpose and manner of procurement of a material 
witness warrant). 
 169. See al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 953. 
 170. See id. 
 171. Hannah Robbins, What’s at stake in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (Mar. 4, 
2011, 6:30 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/whats-stake-ashcroft-v-al-kidd.  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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years after Sept. 11” under the material witness statute.174  At the time, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft, like other officials, bragged that 
“aggressive detention of lawbreakers and material witnesses is vital to 
preventing, disrupting or delaying new attacks.”175 Like many others, al-
Kidd was never called as a witness or charged with any crime (and al-
Hussayen was tried but not convicted).
176
 
After his release al-Kidd sued Ashcroft claiming, in essence, that the 
former U.S. Attorney General had had his subordinates use the Material 
Witness Statute as a pretext to detain terrorist suspects preventively, that is, 
persons suspected of terrorism but for whom evidence was lacking for an 
arrest and criminal charge.
177
  After extended litigation, the Supreme Court 
held that Ashcroft was entitled to qualified immunity because “at the time 
of [the detainee’s] arrest . . . not a single judicial opinion had held that 
pretext could render an objectively reasonable arrest pursuant to a material-
witness warrant unconstitutional.”178 
Although she concurred in the outcome, Justice Ginsburg (with Justices 
Breyer and Sotomayor) nevertheless found the Court’s assumption of the 
existence of a validly obtained material witness warrant to be “puzzling.”179  
She questioned whether an affidavit supporting a material witness warrant is 
valid where the affiant fails to tell the issuing magistrate that there is no 
intent to call the subject of the warrant as a witness in any trial.
180
  She also 
questioned the validity of the warrant where the affidavit “[did] not disclose 
that al-Kidd had cooperated with FBI agents each of the several times they 
had asked to interview him.”181 In addition, she said: 
[T]the Magistrate Judge was not told that al-Kidd’s parents, wife, 
and children were all citizens and residents of the United States.  In 
addition, the affidavit misrepresented that al-Kidd was about to take 
a one-way flight to Saudi Arabia, with a first-class ticket costing 
  
 174. U.S. citizen recalls ‘humiliating’ post-9/11 arrest, FOX NEWS (Feb. 27, 2011), 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/02/27/citizen-recalls-humiliating-post-11-arrest/.  
 175. Id. 
 176. Saudi grad student cleared of terror charges in Idaho, BOSTON.COM (June 11, 2004), 
http://articles.boston.com/2004-06-11/news/29198763_1_visa-fraud-counts-counts-of-visa-fraud-sami-
omar-al-hussayen.  
 177. See al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 955–56. 
 178. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2074. 
 179. See id. at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. 
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approximately $5,000; in fact, al-Kidd had a round-trip, coach-class 
ticket that cost $1,700.
182
 
With this cacophony of misstatements and omissions in the material 
used to justify the warrant, the case went back to the district court, where a 
federal magistrate was appointed to do a report and recommendation on 
cross-motions for summary judgment involving two individual defendants 
(the FBI agents),
183
 and a report and recommendation on cross-motions for 
summary judgment involving the United States.
184
  Both of these reports 
generally favored al-Kidd, and may lead to his eventual compensation for 
what he underwent. 
What is, to use Justice Ginsburg’s word, “puzzling” is the role of the 
lawyers in al-Kidd.  Just because they may enjoy qualified immunity does 
not explain how or why the affidavit misinformation that Justice Ginsburg 
cited in her opinion failed to free al-Kidd from the restrictions earlier.  Even 
if the attorneys involved did not manufacture the misinformation, at some 
point during al-Kidd’s ordeal someone from the government should have 
stepped forward to correct the record.  It would seem that, at a minimum, a 
better exercise of due diligence in the case of an individual being detained 
without charges would be the ethically proper approach. 
Moreover, despite the Court’s finding that there were no cases finding a 
pretextual use of a material witness warrant unconstitutional, it would also 
seem ironic that more had not been learned from the Japanese internment 
cases.  They ought to stand for the proposition that preventive detention by 
any other name is still preventive detention, and that is something Congress 
has yet to authorize in terrorism cases for American citizens residing in the 
United States.  The national security practitioner, while remaining open to 
innovative interpretations of the law, nonetheless must be extremely wary of 
proposals which have atrocious parallels in history.
185
 
  
 182. See id. at 2088. 
 183. Report and Recommendation on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment: Individual Defend-
ants Michael Gneckow and Scott Mace at 2–3, Abdullah al-Kidd v. Alberto Gonzales, No. 1:05-cv-
00093-EJL-MHW (Dist. Idaho June 18, 2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/ 
06/al-Kidd-FBI-liable.pdf.  
 184. Report and Recommendation on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment: United States at 2, 
Abdullah al-Kidd v. Alberto Gonzales, No. 1:05-cv-00093-EJL-MHW (Dist. Idaho June 18, 2012), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/al-kidd-fed-tort.pdf.  
 185. Compare Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214, and Hirabayashi, 328 U.S. 81, with al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 
2074. 
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k. Pro Bono 
Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal 
services to those unable to pay.
186
 
One of the most interesting impacts on the legal profession of the post-
9/11 era is the proliferation of pro bono legal support for the suspected 
terrorists detained at Guantánamo.  Professor Jack Goldsmith of Harvard 
points out that after the Supreme Court’s landmark 2004 decision in Rasul 
v. Bush
187
 established that the detainees were entitled to challenge their 
detention in the courts, “pro bono offers from hundreds of attorneys, 
including many from America’s most elite law firms[,]” came to the 
detainees.
188
  According to Goldsmith, these “lawyers—who came to be 
known as ‘the GTMO Bar’—quickly flooded federal courts with habeas 
corpus petitions from detainees seeking release.”189   
  
 186. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, R. 6.1. The full rule reads as follows: 
 
Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to 
pay. A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services 
per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: 
 
(a) provide a substantial majority of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or 
expectation of fee to: 
(1) persons of limited means or 
(2) charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations 
in matters that are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; 
and 
(b) provide any additional services through: 
(1) delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups 
or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or 
charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in 
matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard 
legal fees would significantly deplete the organization’s economic resources or would be 
otherwise inappropriate; 
(2) delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; 
or 
(3) participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal 
profession. 
 
In addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that 
provide legal services to persons of limited means. 
 
Id. 
 187. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 188. Jack Goldsmith, The Great Legal Paradox of Our Time: How Civil Libertarians Strength-
ened the National Security State,   THE NEW REPUBLIC  (Mar. 16, 2012),   http://www.tnr.com/article/ 
politics/101561/guantanamo-bay-prison-obama?page=0,1.  
 189. Id.  For a discussion of habeas corpus actions, see generally Habeas Corpus, LEGAL 
INFORMATION INSTITUTE (Aug. 19, 2010, 5:17 PM), http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/habeas_corpus. 
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Other experts recently noted that since “2002, over 900 attorneys have 
joined the network sponsored by [Center for Constitutional Rights] filing 
individual habeas petitions for approximately 430 detainees.”190  According 
to these analysts, after several Supreme Court cases legitimated habeas 
litigation: 
[L]arge firms sought out habeas clients—the legal market favored 
firm representation of detainees. In fact, representation of 
Guantánamo detainees became part of law firms’ recruitment 
efforts for new associates. Yet the cases did not only appeal to 
lawyers new to the practice. Detainee representation was high-
profile legal work, and the firms staffed these matters with senior 
partners, signaling to attorneys within the firm, as well as to clients, 
the value the firm placed on the work.
191
 
A media report similarly reflected the popularity of detainee representation.  
As one lawyer involved in the process put it: 
“I had always worried that we would get some input from clients 
that was less than supportive,” [the defense counsel] said. “But we 
must have gotten 10 e-mails, phone calls, personal contacts from 
Fortune 500 companies that said the opposite.  One big client said, 
‘That makes me want to send you more worknot less.’”192 
It was perhaps frustration over the enormous resources the civilian bar 
provided the terrorist suspects that led a former Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Detainee Affairs, Cully Stimson, to make some profoundly 
ill-considered remarks.  In a 2007 interview, he expressed dismay “that 
lawyers at many of the nation’s top firms were representing prisoners at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and that the firms’ corporate clients should 
consider ending their business ties.”193 
Predictably, there was an explosion of criticism, with numerous 
commentators rebuking Stimson for attacking the honorable practice of 
providing vigorous, pro bono representation to even the most reviled 
accused.  The obviously upset editors of the Washington Post wrote that the 
  
 190. Laurel E. Fletcher, Alexis Kelly & Zulaikha Aziz, Defending the Rule of Law: Reconceptual-
izing Guantánamo Habeas Attorneys,  44  CONN.  L.  REV.  617,  648  (2012),  http://connecticutlaw 
review.org/files/2012/04/7-Fletcher-Kelly-Aziz.pdf. 
 191. Id. at 650 (emphasis added). 
 192. Paul Shukovsky, Firm’s Unlikely Client: Bin Laden’s Ex-Driver, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, May 27, 2008, at 1 (quoting statement from Harry Schneider). 
 193. Neil M. Lewis, Official Attacks Top Law Firms Over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/13/washington/13gitmo.html.  
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detainee lawyers were “upholding the highest ethical traditions of the bar by 
taking on the most unpopular of defendants.”194  Though not offering a 
defense for Stimson’s remarks, Harvard law professor Charles Fried 
speculated that perhaps Stimson was “annoyed that his overstretched staff 
lawyers are opposed by highly trained and motivated elite lawyers working 
in fancy offices with art work in the corridors and free lunch laid on in 
sumptuous cafeterias.”195  Regardless, Stimson apologized and promptly 
resigned in an effort to quiet the furor.
196
 
Similar criticism arose in 2010 amid questions about the Justice 
Department’s hiring of a number of lawyers who had previously represented 
Guantánamo detainees.  In an open letter, a group of “attorneys, former 
officials, and policy specialists who have worked on detention issues” 
admirably stated the case: 
The American tradition of zealous representation of unpopular 
clients is at least as old as John Adams’s representation of the 
British soldiers charged in the Boston massacre.  People come to 
serve in the Justice Department with a diverse array of prior private 
clients; that is one of the department’s strengths . . . . To suggest 
that the Justice Department should not employ talented lawyers who 
have advocated on behalf of detainees maligns the patriotism of 
people who have taken honorable positions on contested questions 
and demands a uniformity of background and view in government 
service from which no administration would benefit.
197
 
Yet even as one salutes the outpouring of pro bono support for the 
terrorist detainees, support that no doubt can be traced to finest traditions of 
the Bar to provide quality representation to all accused, concern must be 
expressed by the paradox that foreign terrorists may be—proportionately—
greater beneficiaries of the legal profession’s beneficence than are needy 
U.S. citizens not accused of national security crimes. 
This paradox is suggested by Attorney General Eric Holder’s speech to 
the ABA in February 2012.  In it he lamented the “crisis” with respect to 
indigents’ access to legal talent: 
  
 194. Unveiled Threats, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2007, at A18, available at http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/11/AR2007011101698.html.  
 195. Charles Fried, Mr. Stimson and the American Way, WALL STREET J., Jan. 16, 2007, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116892102246577373-search.html.  
 196. Ashby Jones, Cully Stimson Resigns, WALL STREET J., Feb. 2, 2007, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/02/02/cully-stimson-resigns/.  
 197. Benjamin Wittes et al., Statement on Justice Department Attorney Representation of Guantá-
namo Detainees, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/ 
2010/03/07-guantanamo-statement. 
2012] ETHICAL ISSUES OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 1093 
Across the country, public defender offices and other indigent 
defense providers are underfunded and understaffed.  Too often, 
when legal representation is available to the poor, it’s rendered less 
effective by insufficient resources, overwhelming caseloads, and 
inadequate oversight. 
 
As a result, too many defendants are left to languish in jail for 
weeks, or even months, before counsel is appointed. Too many 
children and adults enter the criminal justice system with nowhere 
to turn for guidance—and little understanding of their rights, the 
charges against them, or the potential sentences—and collateral 
consequences—that they face. Some are even encouraged to waive 
their right to counsel altogether.
198
 
It is not without irony then, that the legal profession, notwithstanding its 
outpouring of very healthy support for foreign terrorist detainees, 
nevertheless finds itself facing inadequate representation for needy 
Americans.
199
  This is plainly an appropriate subject not only for national 
security practitioners but for the entire bar.  Nevertheless, the real test of the 
national security bar’s ethics may come if (when?) there is another horrific 
event, and doing the right thing by defending accused terrorists is not as 
popular as it may be today.  It is in times of crisis that the ethics of the legal 
profession are most tested, and practitioners need to steel themselves for 
those moments—which are sure to come to pass. 
III.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATION: THE INDISPENSABILITY OF MORAL 
COURAGE 
Although this Article has sought to illustrate some of the ethical 
challenges national security law practitioners face, it would be a mistake to 
assume that national security practitioners are somehow more prone to 
ethical failings than others in the legal profession.  Nothing could be further 
from the facts. 
Professor H. Jefferson Powell, who until May 2012 served as the deputy 
assistant attorney general in the OLC at the Department of Justice, reflected 
upon his work with lawyers in a range of government agencies and 
commented that what struck him was “how dedicated the vast majority of 
those people are to doing responsible legal work, in good faith and for the 
  
 198. Speech, Eric Holder, Attorney General, at the American Bar Association’s Summit on Indi-
gent Defense, New Orleans, LA (Feb. 4, 2012), www.justice.gov./iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-
120204.html. 
 199. Compare id. with Shukovsky, supra note 192. 
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highest of motives—pro bono publico, for the public good.”200  He added 
that what impressed him “about the vast majority of the lawyers with whom 
[he] dealt is their conscientious commitment to the law and to providing 
responsible legal advice.”201 
Powell also believed the “particular contribution of government 
lawyers” is to “enable the government to function and to pursue the policies 
that the policymakers prefer but to do so within the law [and] to tell the 
policymakers when necessary that a particular goal or policy cannot be 
pursued lawfully.”202  In the national security context, this can be 
particularly difficult because the stakes are so high, time is so short, and the 
consequences of the proverbial path not taken so difficult to ascertain or 
predict. 
Telling policymakers and other clients what they need to hear versus 
what they may want to hear requires courage; indeed, few legal disciplines 
require the practitioners to exhibit as much courage as does a national 
security law practice.  Unlike most national security activities, the kind of 
courage required is not, however, the physical type, but moral courage.
203
   
This can be hard to muster for anyone, even in the armed forces.   British 
historian Max Hastings points out that “physical bravery is found [in the 
military] more often than the spiritual variety.”204  “Moral courage,” he 
says, “is rare.”205  Yet it is especially important for those in the legal 
profession to demonstrate it.  There is no doubt that in national security 
matters especially, there are times when legal advice is unwelcome, but that 
is when moral courage is most needed.  General Short admonishes that in 
combat situations: 
[D]o not be afraid to tell [the commander] what he really does not 
want to hear—that he has put together this exquisite plan, but his 
targets indeed are not valid ones or his targets may in fact violate 
the law of armed conflict . . . . It will take enormous courage to do 
  
 200. David Jarmul, Kind Words for Colleagues in Washington, DUKE TODAY (July 14, 2012), 
http://today.duke.edu/2012/07/powelldc (statement of H. Jefferson Powell). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. In a 1990 case called U.S. v. Stidman, the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals observed: 
 
[T]here are two kinds of courage involved in the profession of arms and the profession of 
law. On the one hand, many are called upon for physical courage. On the other hand, judges 
are called upon from time to time for moral courage−the courage to subordinate a personal 
philosophy of the law or private distaste . . . to decide an issue logically and dispassionately. 
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 205. Id. 
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that in particular circumstances because you’re always going to be 
junior to your boss . . . . But you have got to be able to do that.
206
 
Judge James E. Baker of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
argues in his book In the Common Defense that the law depends upon the 
“moral courage of lawyers who raise tough questions, who dare to argue 
both sides of every issue, who insist on being heard at the highest levels of 
decision-making, and who ultimately call the legal questions as they believe 
the Constitution dictates . . . .”207 
Judge Baker is, of course, exactly right.  No set of rules can substitute 
for the character of individuals who are ready to do the right thing, 
regardless of the personal consequences.  Only those prepared to make 
whatever sacrifice is necessary to ensure that the nation conducts its 
national security affairs in a lawful—and authentically ethical—manner are 
truly worthy of the sobriquet of a national security law practitioner. 
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